## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

DARRELL WAYNE FRANKLIN, 664409,	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	No. 3:10-CV-2274-K
DOADD OF DADDONG AND DADOLEG	)	
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES,	)	
Defendant.	)	

# FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an order of the District Court, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge follow:

#### FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

#### I. Parties

Plaintiff filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is proceeding *pro se*, and the Court has granted him permission to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Defendant is the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles.

## II. Background

Plaintiff states Defendant has improperly calculated the minimum expiration date of his sentence. He also claims Defendant has violated his constitutional rights by printing the name on his records as "Franklin, Darrell Wayne" rather than "Darrell Wayne Franklin." He seeks

money damages.1

## **III. Screening**

Plaintiff's complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That section provides in pertinent part:

The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) ("Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal—(I) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit.").

Both § 1915A(b) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) provide for *sua sponte* dismissal if the Court finds that the complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Plaintiff also raised claims seeking release from custody. These claims were severed and considered as habeas corpus claims in *Franklin v. Thaler*, 3:10-CV-1830-K.

#### **IV.** Discussion

#### 1. Heck Bar

Plaintiff seeks damages for Defendant's allegedly extending his sentence. In *Heck v*. *Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 claim attacking the constitutionality of a conviction or imprisonment does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." *Heck*, 512 U.S. at 486-87. *Heck* also bars damage claims, which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or pending charge. *Hamilton v. Lyons*, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff's claim for damages is clearly connected to the legality of his sentence. A finding in favor of Plaintiff would imply the invalidity of his current confinement. Plaintiff's confinement, however, has not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Hence, no § 1983 cause of action has yet accrued and these claims should be dismissed with prejudice until the *Heck* conditions are met. *See Johnson v. McElveen*, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (stating dismissal should be with prejudice until *Heck* conditions are met).

### 2. Name Listing

Plaintiff claims that Defendant unlawfully lists his name as "Franklin, Darrell Wayne" rather than "Darrell Wayne Franklin." Plaintiff has shown no constitutional violation based on this claim. The claim should be dismissed as frivolous.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

<u>Findings and Conclusions of the</u> United States Magistrate Judge The Court recommends that: (1) Plaintiff's claims challenging his sentence be dismissed with prejudice until the *Heck* conditions are met; (2) Plaintiff's remaining claims be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

Signed this 23<sup>rd</sup> day of February, 2011.

PAUL D. STICKNEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

# INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).